In this paper, the communication mode selection issue as well as pricing mechanism in relaying enhanced device-to-device (D2D) 
Introduction
With the rapid growth of advanced wireless communication technologies, wireless networks have been widely accepted as an inexpensive solution to provide last mile access to the Internet. At the same time, user demands for mobile broadband are undergoing an unprecedented rise [1] [2] . In China alone, the fast growth and widely use of instant messaging applications such as Wechat and Weibo for multimedia file sharing and online video browsing are already challenging the limits of current cellular systems. The ever growing demand for higher data rates and capacity requires new technology for the next generation (5G) cellular systems.
To alleviate the huge infrastructure investment with the exponential growth of mobile service and improve local service flexibility, device-to-device (D2D) communications have been proposed as one of the key techniques in the Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) Long Term Evolution Advanced (LTE-Advanced). The principle of D2D communications is shown in Figure1. From the figure, user equipment (UE) nearby can communicate either directly or access the Base Station (BS) through D2D relaying. Due to the physical proximity, this new communication paradigm provides significant performance gains in terms of spectral efficiency, energy efficiency and system capacity. However, unlike the existing short-range wireless transmission techniques (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth), D2D communications usually utilize the licensed spectrum bands [3] , thus can guarantee uniform service provision. Furthermore, D2D communications can provide offload function and avoid congestion in the existing cellular network.
Since the potential benefits of D2D communications for both operators and users still need to be explored, extensive studies have been carried out in the literature. In [4] , the basic concept of D2D communications is introduced, and the technical challenges and
Figure 1. D2D Communications Scenario
When related to the scenario of D2D relaying communications [7] , although some of current researches have already discussed the procedure of how devices can discover each other to form the D2D relaying peer [8] , one critical issue often been omitted is that under which condition should UEs switch to D2D communication mode. In order to carry out D2D relaying, besides link conditions and user's requirement, an indispensible requirement is whether there exists certain device to be selected. Furthermore, once the D2D relaying mode has been chosen, the pricing mechanism is also a great challenge. Since device use its own resource for D2D relaying, it is reasonable and practicable that it should charge for its relaying service. However, a dilemma lies in how should a device bids a reasonable service price that not only satisfying UE's requirement, but also maximize its own utility. Moreover, what is the optimal policy of BS in order to encourage D2D relaying behavior?
To this ends, and by taking the user's density into account, this paper firstly answers the question of "when should D2D relaying mode been chosen?" Moreover, based on non-cooperative game theory as well as cooperative game theory, we propose the optimal pricing mechanism for D2D communication peers to answer the question of "How should D2D relaying behavior been encouraged?" The proposed mechanism is based on the user's payoff model which considers both user device's demands and constraint ability.
We structure the article as follows. Considering the impact of user density, Section 2 analyzes the D2D communication mode selection criteria. Section 3 first proposes the user's payoff model. Furthermore, based on non-cooperative game theory as well as cooperative game theory, we arrive to the optimal pricing mechanism. The numerical results are provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. To clarify user's roles, we denote the user who initiates D2D communication as "UE", while users participate in D2D relaying as "devices".
Figure 2. Analytical Model of D2D Relaying Mode
The analytical model of D2D relaying mode selection is described in Figure 2 . Assume that a circle centered at position O and with a radius R denotes a cell. Within this cell, the BS is located in the center. Suppose at a certain time t, a certain UE i located at position ' O in Figure 2 and its distance to the BS is d. Furthermore, the transmission ranges of UE i can be represented by a circle with a radius 0 R which is centered at ' O . The shaded region within the UE i 's coverage circle represents UE i 's effective D2D communication area (EDCA), where
. Only if there exists at least another device (referred to as the "star" shown in Figure  2 ) within its EDCA, UE i is eligible to initiating a D2D relaying mode transition.
D2D Communication Transition Threshold
Suppose that all the UEs arrive to the cell independently, and UEs are evenly distributed within the cell. At a certain time t, the user density within the cell is  per unit area. The average number of UEs within the cell then can be calculated as . In these parameters,
denotes the probability that an arbitrary device is located within the UE i 's EDCA. According to [9] , the value of 
As a result, the probability that UE i can find m number of D2D devices within its EDCA is written as:
As mentioned above, a certain time t, if UE i successfully finds another device in its EDCA, then UE i can switch to D2D mode and begin a peer-to-peer discovery. This is given by the following expression:
Substituting (2) into (3), we have:
In this formula, the minimal value of  that satisfies (4) is set as the D2D relaying mode transition threshold 0  . Whenever a UE want to start D2D communications, it should first check the current user density. If 0   , for example, in the dense populated public place like shopping mall or theater, it might be easily to find another device to carry out D2D communications. While on the other hand, when 0   , it is recommended that D2D communication mode should not be selected since UE might not possibly found a suitable device within its EDCA.
The Pricing Mechanism for D2D Relaying
After D2D mode has been selected, another dilemma lies in how to encourage devices to participate in D2D relaying communications. However, unlike fixed relaying issues, devices participating in D2D relaying have only limited resources such as battery, data storage, and bandwidth. Therefore D2D relaying should consider both different candidate devices' ability and UE's preference as well.
Moreover, as mentioned above, devices that act as relays for other users use their own resources. They should get a decent payback from UEs who initiate the D2D relaying. Otherwise, if the charged/payoff for D2D services is not lucrative enough, these devices may turn down the D2D relaying request, and UEs who call for D2D relaying may end up with traditional BS relaying mode, which has lower speed and less efficiency. Therefore, after D2D mode selected, effective pricing models should also be designed to encourage devices to participate in this type of communication.
Optimal Pricing Method Based On Non-Cooperative Game
In this section, with regard to user's demands and abilities, we will consider the pricing strategy of devices participating in D2D communications. Based on both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, we make the following assumptions without loss of generality: (i) devices have limited bandwidth resource to provide relaying services; (ii) devices compete with each other by setting relaying service prices for more revenue; (iii) 
Playoff Model
Under these assumptions, the relation of devices in the cell can be modeled by noncooperative Bertrand game model [10] . The players of the game model are chosen the suitable D2D relaying device. Here, we assume at time t, the total number of devices that want to and can be selected to carry out D2D relaying is K. Then, the corresponding strategies of a certain device i is proposing charging price P i .While for certain UE, the strategy is choosing the best device peer among K devices who can satisfy UE's Quality of Service(QoS). Consequently, the payoff model of the device i who are competing with other devices for providing D2D relaying can be defined as
Where
P denote the service price offered by K devices. D i denotes desired amount of QoS requirements of the UE which initiate D2D relaying. Since each device has limited ability, it is possible that device i might satisfy only partial of UE's D2D relaying requirement. Therefore, Q i is introduced to represent the efficiency of D i , that is, how much portion of UE's requirement would be fulfilled. Hence, ii DQ is interpreted as the percentage or portion of UE's desired amount of requirement that can be met through D2D relaying by device i. Denote c i as the cost factor of device i to serve as the D2D relaying peer. Moreover, in order to encourage D2D relaying behavior, it is assumed that device i will obtain the revenue r i from BS for providing D2D relaying service.
With K devices participate in D2D relaying, the total revenue of the network then can be expressed as
Utility Functions
Under the assumption that the D2D relaying service provided by different devices in cellular network is replaceable and differentiated, the D2D relaying service in the cellular network can be modeled as an oligopoly market producing differentiated but substitutability goods. It is obvious that the total utility of all devices (competitors) should be a function containing both UE's demand D i and the corresponding charging price P i . More specifically, it should be a second-order differentiable and strictly concave function of user demand. According to [11] , the quadratic utility function originated from economics theory meets the requirements of utility function of D2D relaying, and can be applied to model the utility of devices in this paper.
Let U(D) represents the total utility function of devices within the cellular network, with above considerations, U(D) should be set up as:
denote the demand vector of all the K devices. In order to obtain the maximal utility of all devices, and according to given charging price P i , the optimal value of D i should be resolved. The optimal D i leading to maximal U(D) can be obtained by differentiating U(D) with respect to D i and set the ratio to zero.
By jointly solve function (8) for each D i , i=1,2…,K, the optimal demand function can be obtained as :
Nash Equilibrium of Non-Cooperative Game
Given the optimal demand function shown in (9), it can be observed that each UE's optimal demand is closely related to the price P i charged by D2D relaying device i. Consequently, with the variation of charging price P i , the corresponding optimal demand of each UE also varies. For a K-player non-cooperative game, the Nash equilibrium point of the non-cooperative game is the strategy profile that no player can increase his or her payoff by choosing another scheme while other players' action remains unaffected [12] . Thus, the Nash equilibrium price can be obtained through the best response function of each player in the non-cooperative game.
According to the revenue function in (5) and the demand function in (9), by considering the optimal demand, each device's best strategy is to get larger revenue by meeting UE's requirement through D2D relaying service. The revenue issue of each device can be then expressed as a function of charging price. By substituting equation (9) in to equation (5) 
In order to obtain the optimal charging price P i , by differentiating R i (P i ) in (10) with respect to P i , it follows that
Consequently, the optimal charging price represented by 
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By jointly solving equation (12), the best charging price (BCP) * i P of the each D2D relaying device can be obtained similarly. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium price of the K competed D2D relaying devices can be obtained.
Optimal Pricing Method Based On Cooperative Game

Cooperative Game Model
In aforementioned model, we assume that devices are competing with each other for providing D2D relaying, so as to attract more users to increase their revenue, especially when the service quality and price offered by different devices are comparable and these devices belong to different Service Providers (SP). However, since severe competition among devices may result in lower service price and shrink total profits, which may be not acceptable for the devices performing D2D relaying. In the competitive wireless service environment, all or part of devices may turn to coalition instead of competition. Moreover, there is also another possibility that some of the devices belong to certain SP, which has the same profit goal. In order to characterize the strategies and payoffs for such situation, a cooperative game model can be applied [12] . In this model, in order to gain more profits, several different devices cooperate with each others in an oligopoly market through selling the same quality of D2D relaying service to user at the coalition price; therefore the strategies chosen by each device is the service price and is set to be the same price.
Similarly to the definitions in (5) and (6), under cooperative game model, the payoff   
Where C i P and C i D demote the charging price and UE's demand respectively when cooperative game model is used.
As regard to the utility function, the quadratic function showed in (7), is also applied. Considering the situation when all the devices set the same charging price, we can derive the demand function as
Using the similar solution described in 3.1.3, the optimal charging price /m 2 . From Figure3, it is observed that when user density is about 2.3×10 -6 /m 2 , then the probability of finding at least one D2D device in a UE's s EDCA is close to 0.5. This is in accordance with the analysis value. Consequently, only under this situation, should the UE consider to switch into D2D communication mode. When the user density is approximately 3×10 -5 /m 2 , a UE can definitely find another D2D device in its EDCA. 
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Figure4 shows the revenue of different devices when they offering different charging prices. As can be observed in Figure 4 (a), given three particular service price of device B, with the varying charging price of device A, the corresponding revenue of device A also varies. With the same price charged by device A, when the competing device B offering a higher price (e.g., P B =0.4), more revenue can be obtained by device A. This phenomenon can be explained as more UEs might turn to device A for D2D relaying in order to avoid the high price charged by device B. Moreover, it can be seen that the revenue of device A first increases with the increase of charging price; then after a certain price, the revenue begins to decrease. This certain price is exact what we defined as BCP of device A when the price policy of device B is settled.
In Figure 4 (b), the relationship between the revenue of device B and the charging of device A is plotted. It is shown that for a certain price settled by device B, the revenue of device B increases with the increased charging price of device A. This phenomenon can be explained as when the price charged by device A gradually increases, more UE will select device B as the D2D relaying device for its cheaper price, which leads to the increased revenue of device B. Furthermore, as can be observed that when the charging price of device A is relatively cheap (below 0.2 in the Figure 4(b) ), the best price policy of device B is to adopt a higher price (e.g., P b =0.4). On the other hand, when device A adopt a higher price policy, the smart choice of device B is chosen a cheaper charging price (e.g., P b =0.3).
From Figure4, it can be inferred that in order to maximize each device's profits, a dynamic price policy should be adopted by both devices. That is, each device should dynamically adjust its anticipatory charging price so as to achieve maximal profit. Thus, the Nash equilibrium price benefited for both participants in the game can be found. 
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Copyright ⓒ 2015 SERSC Figure 5 shows the comparison of Nash equilibrium prices under non-cooperative game, as well as coalition price of cooperative game with the same network condition. As can be observed, for non-cooperative game, by first plotting the optimal charging price * i P described in function (12) , the BCP of two devices can be obtained. The Nash equilibrium price is described as the intersection of the BCP of two devices. Since the BCP of two devices are linear functions shown in equation (12) , the Nash equilibrium price under any network scenario exists and is unique. Moreover, when the competition between the two devices is intensified (lager  adopted), it can be seen from the figure that the Nash equilibrium price also decrease. This phenomenon could be explained as: when the competition is becoming fierce among D2D device, in order to attract more UE to select the device as D2D relaying service provider, the best strategy is to decrease charging price so as to be more competitive. As for cooperative game, the coalition price is obtained by adopted equation (16). It can be obvious seen that the coalition price is higher than the Nash equilibrium price. This situation is owing to the fact that under cooperative game, since there is no competition among D2D devices, the maximal charging price is obtained under monopolization.
Figure6 shows the total revenue of two devices under different game model. It can be observed that with the adoption of coalition price, the total revenue is maximized when D2D devices cooperate with each other. While for non-cooperative method, due to intense competition among devices, each D2D device only aims at maximize its own profits, which leads to reduced total revenue compared with cooperative model. Moreover, with the increase of charging price of Device A, the difference of total revenue under two different game models first become smaller, and then gradually become larger. This phenomenon can be interpreted as: for non-cooperative method, with the increase of charging price of device A, Nash equilibrium price is gradually achieved which leads to the maximal total revenue. While for cooperative method, the coalition price is also arrived with the increase of charging price of device A, hence leads to the maximized total revenue.
Conclusion
In this paper, the mode selection issues as well as pricing mechanism in deviceto-device relaying communications is discussed. We first explore the problem of "when D2D relaying mode should be selected?" By considering the user density within the cell, we point out the exact condition under which should a user change into D2D communication model. Furthermore, based on non-cooperative game theory as well as cooperative game theory, we propose the optimal pricing mechanism for D2D communication peers to answer the question of "How should the D2D relaying behavior be encouraged?" The proposed mechanism is based on the user's payoff model, which both considers user's demands and D2D devices' constraint ability. Simulation results demonstrate that under game theoretical model, the proposed scheme can achieve the maximal utility for D2D devices when the BCP price is adopted, hence better user experience can be obtained.
